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HOUSE OF JUDGMENT: ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN THE ORTHODOX JEWISH COMMUNITY
RANDY LINDA STURMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, lawyers have become increasingly interested in explor-
ing alternative methods of resolving disputes outside of the civil court sys-
tem. The primary motivation behind this interest is the litigants' desire to re-
duce litigation costs and to speed up the process of obtaining relief. Litigants
must often wait years before their case is heard by ajudge or jury. By litigat-
ing in a forum outside the civil court system, litigants can drastically reduce
this waiting period to a few months and reduce the increasingly burdensome
costs of litigation, as well.
Convenience is another reason why many attorneys prefer to use alter-
native methods of dispute resolution. Rather than appearing periodically for
trial call and waiting to be told at a moment's notice that a courtroom has
become available, the parties can fix a date to have their case heard when us-
ing alternative methods of dispute resolution. This certainty helps attorneys
coordinate the appearance of lay and expert witnesses, who often have busy
schedules, because the attorneys can provide their witnesses with a specific
time when they will be called.
Many medical malpractice cases are presently decided by binding arbi-
tration panels rather than through the traditional courtroom methods.
Increasing numbers of managed care contracts mandate the use of such
alternative methods of dispute resolution. In such cases, a panel of three
retired judges may be used in lieu of having the case decided by a jury.'
* J.D. University of Florida College of Law, 1981; Ph.D. University of California, San
Diego Department of Anthropology 1999 (title of dissertation: "A Matter of Life and Death:
Cultural, Legal, Religious and Ethical Considerations in End-of-life Decisions, Jerusalem,
Israel); Lecturer, University of California, San Diego Department of Anthropology (course
titles: Law, Medicine and Culture, Law in the Bible and in America), 1993, 1994, 2000; In-
tern, United States Supreme Court, 1977; Assistant District Attorney, Miami, Florida, 1981-
1984; private law practice, 1985-1994; Member of Florida bar since 1981; Member of Cali-
fornia bar since 1988.
1. For example, the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Service (JAMS) frequently pro-
vides lawyers and retired judges to hear such cases.
1
Sturman: House of Judgment: Alternate Dispute Resolution in the Orthodox J
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Business contracts are increasingly including provisions mandating the
use of alternative dispute resolution instead of litigation. These provisions
not only allows the parties to reduce the costs of litigation and the time it
would take to get to trial, but the provisions can also discourage unscrupu-
lous business practices in which one party takes advantage of the other by
strategically delaying the litigation process.
The Bet Din, a Hebrew term that means "house of judgment," is one
form of alternate dispute resolution that allows Jews to resolve disputes be-
tween themselves in a private forum using a panel of three rabbis, or occa-
sionally, by using a single rabbi. As an institution, the Bet Din began thou-
sands of years ago, and certain Jewish groups throughout the world have
continued to used it in various forms with various frequency.
Presently, in the United States, the Bet Din usually consists of a panel of
three judges.2 In all sects of Judaism, the Bet Din has jurisdiction over reli-
gious matters, such as divorce or conversions. In the Orthodox Jewish com-
munity, however, the Bet Din is also used as a method of resolving other
types of disputes, including complicated business disputes.' The litigants
must sign a contract agreeing to binding arbitration before the Battei Din4
will render a final judgment. The judgments of the Battei Din are binding,
and they can be filed in civil court and enforced like any other judgment.
The Bet Din differs from other forms of alternate dispute resolution in
two important respects. First, no statutes mandate the use of the Bet Din, and
business contracts rarely include clauses mandating the use of the Bet Din.
After a dispute arises, the parties voluntarily agree to be bound by the deci-
sion of the Bet Din in lieu of going to court. Thus, some force other than
statutory or contractual obligation, such as social pressure or religious con-
viction, must motivate the parties to agree to use this method of dispute reso-
lution.
Second, the Bet Din involves the use of the parties' cultural peers or
members of their own ethnic group to decide the case. The implicit hope
here is that the parties can have their case decided by individuals who hold
cultural beliefs and values similar to their own. The extent to which the liti-
gants believe that this has occurred may have a profound effect on whether
or not the litigants are satisfied with the outcome of the process.
This article is confined to the use of the Bet Din by the Orthodox Jewish
community of Los Angeles and San Diego, California. In this community
there are several Battei Din: the "standing," or established panel of three
judges organized under the auspices of the Rabbinic Council of California
based in Los Angeles; a Bet Din used less often in San Diego primarily by
members of the Chabad sect and organized by one or two leading rabbis in
2. See BERNARD J. MEISLIN, JEWISH LAW IN AMERICAN TRIBUNALS 123 (1976).
3. See id. at 123-24; ELLIOT N. DORFF & ARTHuR RoSETT, A LIvING TREE: THE ROOTS
AND GROWTH OF JEWISH LAW 341 (1988) (noting that rabbis play a role in answering legal
questions).
4. The plural of Bet Din.
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the community on an as-needed basis; and several other Battei Din in the
Los Angeles area that are less organized or are assembled by local rabbis
whenever a Bet Din is needed.' Part I of this article will describe two spe-
cific cases brought before a Bet Din. Part II will examine the expectations of
Bet Din litigants and the reactions of the Bet Din participants.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE CASES
A. Dissolution of a Real Estate Partnership
This case was litigated in San Diego before the Chabad Bet Din. It in-
volved a dispute between two individuals who had both contributed to a real
estate development and were disputing how the development's earnings
should be divided.
Peter Newman6 brought this claim before the Bet Din. Mr. Newman is a
successful real estate developer who regularly puts together real estate pro-
jects worth millions of dollars. Mr. Newman lived with his grandmother,
who was an Orthodox Jew, until he was thirteen-years-old. He then went to
live with his father, who Mr. Newman described as a "more liberal Ortho-
dox."7 Mr. Newman is now married with two adult children
Mr. Newman wants to observe his religious tenets more closely. He
does not eat pork or lobster because they are not kosher, but he does not
keep a kosher home. He wants to make his home kosher, but he has not yet
convinced his wife to agree to this. He wants to become strictly kosher be-
cause he wants to keep more of the traditions. He also feels badly that his
daughter's family, who is fairly religious, must eat on paper plates when
they visit him because since his dishes are not kosher.'
Mr. Newman tries to observe the Sabbath more strictly. He has set a
goal for himself this year of keeping one Sabbath a month by not driving, by
studying instead of working, and possibly by going to synagogue. Ulti-
mately, he hopes to increase the number of Sabbaths per month that he ob-
serves.
0
Mr. Newman moved to San Diego from Canada a number of years ago.
He met Rabbi Goldstein of one of the Chabad synagogues in San Diego and
started going to Rabbi Goldstein's synagogue." Mr. Newman liked the syna-
5. Approximately 15 informants involved in six cases decided by a Bet Din were inter-
viewed, including litigants, lawyers, and rabbis, who adjudicated the cases.
6. Interview with Peter Newman. To protect the anonymity of sources, pseudonyms for
all of the Bet Din participants have been used, and references to the dates of the interviews
have been omitted.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
2000] 419
3
Sturman: House of Judgment: Alternate Dispute Resolution in the Orthodox J
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
gogue because he felt that although the rabbis were fairly observant, they
were very accepting of others, regardless of one's degree of religious com-
mitment.'" For instance, they did not mind if one drove to synagogue on the
Sabbath, even though Jewish law forbids driving on that day.
Both Mr. Newman and the defendants regularly give money to Rabbi
Goldstein's synagogue. However, the defendants belong to a Conservative
Jewish congregation in San Diego, while Mr. Newman attends services at
Rabbi Jacobson's synagogue.
Mr. Newman met the defendants through Rabbi Goldstein. Mr. New-
man had been looking for someone to help develop some of his land, and
Rabbi Goldstein introduced him to some people from South Africa who
were interested in a business venture. 4 Mr. Newman took a liking to them
and decided to enter a business deal with them. He let their attorney prepare
the partnership papers. In retrospect, he felt this was a mistake because the
contract did not properly protect his interests. However, Mr. Newman ne-
glected to give the contract to his attorney for review."
Had the project been successful, the partnership probably would have
worked. However, the defendants charged certain expenses to the business
that lead to a loss on paper, thus eliminating any reimbursements or profits
that Mr. Newman may have received." Mr. Newman did not feel as though
he was treated fairly, especially since the defendants had taken out over $2.2
million in fees and expenses, yet still claimed a loss. 7
Rabbi Jacobson, one of the rabbis who sat on the Bet Din during Peter
Newman's case, also describes the case as a dispute between two partners
involved in real estate development. 8 Each partner was supposed to receive
a certain percentage after the costs. Although the project generated revenue,
there was no profit. Rabbi Jacobson felt that because the contractual terms
were fairly clear, Mr. Newman had little chance of succeeding in a secular
court.'
After realizing that his partners were not dealing fairly with him, Mr.
Newman contacted his lawyer and filed a civil action. Mr. Newman also
contacted Rabbi Goldstein, who offered to serve as a mediator. Rabbi Gold-
stein proposed a solution that Mr. Newman thought was fair, but the defen-
dants would not accept the proposal."
Mr. Newman had three main reasons for agreeing to litigate his case be-
fore the Bet Din rather than continuing to use the secular court system:
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Interview with Rabbi Jacobson.
19. See id.
20. See Interview with Peter Newman.
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Rabbi Goldstein persuaded him, he thought he would get a fair and moral
disposition of the case (perhaps with a better result than in civil court), and
he wanted expedited proceedings. Rabbi Goldstein convinced the parties to
go to a Bet Din because he "didn't want us to wash our dirty laundry in a
public forum, as we were both associated with him."'" Mr. Newman wanted
to accommodate the rabbi's feelings.22
Mr. Newman's attorney, who is not Jewish, researched the Bet Din and
felt it was a reasonable option. Mr. Newman's attorney felt he would have
better success before a jury than before a judge. Although the letter of the
contract was not violated, a jury could find that the intent and the spirit of
the contract had been broken. Thus, he felt that he would have an advantage
in a forum where the judges were more interested in a fair and just decision
than in a strict legal interpretation. Moreover, a Bet Din would be less ex-
pensive and more expedient than a civil trial.'
The Bet Din panel consisted of Rabbis Jacobson, Goldstein, and
Chernofsky. Rabbis Jacobson and Goldstein are from San Diego and knew
the parties fairly well. Rabbi Chemofsky is from New York and is an expert
in the laws pertaining to the Bet Din. Whereas a rabbi's basic training in-
cludes the study of laws, most of those laws are ritualistic rather than civil.
For instance, Talmudic law learned in rabbinical school is of little practical
benefit in deciding legal issues pertaining business disputes.
A rabbi who wants to learn Jewish law as it pertains to business matters
may either go on to a school for diyanim, or judges, to earn the equivalent of
a graduate degree or intern with another rabbi who is experienced in con-
ducting Battei Din. There are very few schools for diyanim, and it could take
as many as seven or eight years to earn a degree from one of these schools.
Rabbi Chernofsky has such a degree and travels around the country hearing
cases on Battei Din.'
The Battei Din process is fairly informal. At the first coffee break,
Rabbi Chernofsky told Mr. Newman that Mr. Newman had been "snook-
ered." Mr. Newman was very encouraged by this comment and felt that he
would get what he deserved.26
Mr. Newman later discovered that rabbis on a Bet Din, rather than de-
ciding a case based strictly on Jewish law or equitable considerations, pro-
vide all relevant documents to attorneys who are familiar with American
law. These attorneys provide their analysis of those documents to the rabbis.
In Mr. Newman's case, three different attorneys and a retired judge reviewed
the documents and came to the same conclusion: according to the terms of
the agreement, the defendants had not violated the contract. Thus, much to
21. Interview with Rabbi Jacobson.
22. See Interview with Peter Newman.
23. See id.
24. See Interview with Rabbi Jacobson.
25. See id.
26. See Interview with Peter Newman.
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the surprise of Mr. Newman, the rabbis applied American law rather than
Jewish law, and the fact that Mr. Newman had been "snookered" had no
bearing on the decision. The rabbis awarded Mr. Newman only costs and le-
gal fees, which the defendants paid out over eighteen months.'
Mr. Newman was very disappointed with the judgment. However, he
still maintains regular contact and a friendship with both Rabbi Jacobson and
Rabbi Goldstein.28 Both Mr. Newman and the defendants still attend reli-
gious services at the Chabad synagogue. Mr. Newman's adult son, with
whom he regularly does business, is amicable toward the defendants; how-
ever, Mr. Newman is still bitter and unwilling to speak with them. Although
he agrees with his son that he is partly to blame for the problem because he
should have been more careful in drafting the contract, he still feels they did
not act in good faith. 9
Mr. Newman is familiar with the civil court process and has previously
litigated in that forum.0 In comparing the bet din to civil court, Mr.
Newman described it as a similar process in that evidence is introduced and
considered and a judge can ask the attorneys questions. Both the judges in
civil court and the rabbis conducting the bet din are often very well
informed. He felt that the bet din was much less formal than the secular
court. He described it as an arbitration that is supposed to be based on
religious law."
Mr. Newman emphatically believes he would have fared better if the
Bet Din had been composed entirely of strangers. He felt that, since Rabbi
Goldstein knew both parties, "in order to get off the hot box, he resorted to a
legal opinion rather than a moral one."'32 However, Mr. Newman acknowl-
edged that Rabbi Goldstein was the only one who knew the parties well
enough to assemble the Bet Din.33
Still, Mr. Newman would use a Bet Din again, but only if he had a dis-
pute with another Jewish person. Also, he would try to choose a more inde-
pendent arena. In spite of his complaints about the experience, Mr. Newman
believed in the purpose of the Bet Din and felt that the true traditional mean-
ing was important: "to settle disputes by Jewish law and not expose our
problems to the open community. '
27. See id. Rabbi Goldstein took it upon himself to collect this money from the defen-
dants and send it to Mr. Newman. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. Id.
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B. Dissolution of a Software Business Partnership
This case was litigated before the Chabad Bet Din in San Diego. George
Stein and Mr. Ginsberg formed a partnership to develop a computer software
business. Mr. Stein had invested a substantial amount of money in the part-
nership. Mr. Stein became dissatisfied with the Mr. Ginsberg's lack of pro-
ductivity and decided to dissolve the partnership.35
George Stein grew up in the deep South in a home that was Jewish but
not religious. He has been a member of Rabbi Jacobson's Chabad congrega-
tion for about ten or twelve years and considers himself to be an observant
Jew.36 Mr. Stein is a graduate of Yale law school and is a licensed attorney.
He has tried cases in civil court, but his main area of specialization is corpo-
rate finance."
George Williams, who represented Mr. Stein before the Bet Din, is not
Jewish. He described himself as a "non-practicing Christian."'3 He is also a
graduate of Yale law school who knew Mr. Stein from college. The two
have been friends for thirty years. Mr. Williams has tried cases in civil court
and had one other case that tangentially involved a Bet Din.39 In that case, he
represented a client in a suit arising out of a divorce. The issue was whether
a prior decision of a Bet Din in New York was binding in a civil court in
California.' Although he did not represent his client at the previous Bet Din,
he did research legal issues pertaining to its enforcement."
George Miller, who represented Mr. Ginsberg, described himself as
Jewish but "extremely reform." He was not affiliated with the Chabad syna-
gogue but felt close to some of their leaders because they had helped friends
of his in a manner he described as "lifesaving." Mr. Miller thus helped the
synagogue leaders occasionally by providing legal advice. Rabbi Goldstein
called Mr. Miller and asked him to represent "the tougher side" as a favor to
the rabbi, and Mr. Miller agreed.'2
Mr. Stein decided to litigate before a Bet Din because two observant
Jews are required under Jewish law to have their disputes resolved before a
Jewish tribunal. Except for this requirement, which he felt morally bound to
abide by, he would have taken the case to civil court.43 Following the re-
quirements of Jewish law with regard to this issue was so important to Mr.
Stein that his partnership contract with Mr. Ginsberg specified that all dis-
35. See Interview with George Stein.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Interview with George Williams.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Interview with George Miller.
43. See Interview with George Stein.
2000]
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putes arising under the contract would be decided before a Bet Din.'
Mr. Miller and Mr. Williams confirmed that the partners' contract obli-
gated the parties to settle their contractual disputes before a Bet Din. Mr.
Williams felt that there were secondary benefits to using a Bet Din, which
were similar to the reasons why one would use arbitration rather than go
through court.45 He felt it would be faster and more economical to allow the
parties to maintain some privacy and avoid airing "their dirty laundry in pub-
lic."' Moreover, another potential client of Mr. Stein's might have been hurt
had the dispute been made public.47
Mr. Williams was not consulted about whether or not it was in his cli-
ent's best interest to have the case heard before a Bet Din rather than in civil
court. However, as an attorney, he agreed with the decision. He felt there
was a benefit where the litigants know the rabbis deciding the case because
the rabbis could more easily discern the parties' credibility. Mr. Williams
also felt that the parties would be more inclined to settle because the rabbis
would help them reach a compromise.48
Mr. Stein had originally wanted to use the Rabbinic Council of Califor-
nia's Bet Din in Los Angeles because he thought they would be more
knowledgeable about the law. He was also concerned because he was a large
contributor to the Chabad congregation in San Diego and thought it would
be difficult for them to hear his case. Mr. Ginsberg was also a member of the
Chabad congregation but was not a large financial contributor. Ultimately,
Mr. Stein felt his status as a contributor worked against him because the rab-
bis went to greater lengths than necessary to be fair to Mr. Ginsberg.49
Rabbi Jacobson convinced Mr. Stein to use the local Bet Din, telling
him that it was closer and more convenient. Furthermore, Mr. Ginsberg
wanted to use the local Bet Din. In retrospect, Mr. Stein felt that it was bash-
ert' that he picked the San Diego Bet Din and that they rendered the deci-
sion they did.5
Both Mr. Ginsberg, who was an Israeli, and Mr. Stein were members of
the Chabad congregation. Under the terms of the partnership agreement, Mr.
Stein would invest approximately one million dollars, and Mr. Ginsberg
would develop the product. After a substantial period of time, Mr. Stein no-
ticed that Mr. Ginsberg was not producing anything. Mr. Stein finally de-
manded the dissolution of the partnership and the return of some of his in-
vestment. Mr. Ginsberg claimed he was still working on the product and
44. See id.
45. See Interview with George Williams.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Interview with George Stein.
50. Bashert means fate or destiny.
51. See Interview with George Stein.
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needed more time. He refused to return any of Mr. Stein's investment.52
The case was litigated before a Bet Din composed of Rabbis Jacobson
and Goldstein, the two Chabad rabbis from San Diego, and Rabbi Chernof-
sky, an expert from New York. According to Rabbi Jacobson, it became
clear to them that Mr. Ginsberg was at fault, and they ruled in favor of Mr.
Stein, awarding him $60,000.
Both attorneys described the Bet Din process as fairly informal. Coffee
and cake was served in the room where the case was heard. Throughout the
proceedings, an effort was made to get both parties to come to an agreement.
Only after it became clear that the two sides had irreconcilable differences
did the rabbis render a verdict.'
The rabbis asked both sides to tell the facts and assumed they would be
truthful. Mr. Williams said that although they might tell related facts accord-
ing to their own perspective, he thought the parties would be less likely to
intentionally lie before a Bet Din than in a civil court. Unlike the parties in a
civil proceeding, the parties involved in a Bet Din regularly see each other
and therefore would be more likely to be truthful.55
The rabbis heard testimony from both parties and then tried to talk to
each party outside the presence of the other. The rabbis tried hard to under-
stand each party's position and to enable each party to understand the other's
position. Although the case was complicated and technical, the rabbis even-
tually were able to resolve the issues.56
According to Mr. Williams, Rabbi Chernofsky seemed to be more
knowledgeable and experienced at trying cases.' The rabbis were very cour-
teous, and the fact that Mr. Williams was not Jewish did not seem to make a
difference in how they treated him. He felt that they were more concerned
with the quality of his representation than with his religious orientation. Oc-
casionally, Rabbi Goldstein would lapse into speaking Hebrew for "psycho-
logical reasons," and Rabbi Chernofsky would translate for Mr. Williams."
The Bet Din process was designed to perform a different function than
the secular courts because the Bet Din functions with respect to a limited
class of people with their own value structure, whereas secular courts must
deal with a diverse mixture of people and issues.
In comparing the Bet Din to the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Ser-
vice (JAMS), Mr. Williams had more faith in the impartiality and fairness of
the Bet Din than in JAMS. He felt that because JAMS is in the business of
hearing cases, attorneys who often brought cases to JAMS could get prefer-
ential treatment. Conversely, the Bet Din is not in the business of making
52. See id.
53. See Interview with Rabbi Jacobson.
54. See Interview with George Miller; see also interview with George Williams.
55. See Interview with George Williams.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
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money from settling disputes and is indifferent as to whether a party brings
them cases in the future. 9
Mr. Miller also described the Bet Din as a "quasi-mediation" process
that was quite informal. The opposing counsel presented briefs and written
summaries of the claims, but he did not think that that made much of a dif-
ference in the rabbis' decision. He did not hear anyone talk about Jewish
law. Rather, they seemed to apply "common sense, with a sprinkling of con-
tract."' He described the rabbis as "more worldly and intelligent than one
would imagine and less forgiving."'" Mr. Miller found the rabbis to be im-
partial.62
The Bet Din process was very informal. The participants sat around a
table and discussed the issues. No witnesses were called, and the documents
were merely handed to them and read without the formal procedure for lay-
ing a foundation for the introduction of evidence required in civil court.63
Prior to rendering the verdict, the Bet Din ordered Mr. Ginsberg to
complete various work in furtherance of the goals of the corporation. Many
months later, when he failed to perform the work, the rabbis ruled against
him and in favor of Mr. Stein. Both lawyers considered this an attempt to
mediate between the parties to see if there was any way that the partnership
could be salvaged or realize part of its original goals. Only after it became
clear that Mr. Ginsberg would not perform the work did the rabbis rule
against him."
Mr. Ginsberg was very angry with the verdict and refused to pay. Some
time later, he moved back to Israel. After Mr. Stein attempted to collect the
judgment, Rabbi Jacobson wrote him a letter asking him to leave Mr. Gins-
berg alone. Rabbi Jacobson felt that Mr. Ginsberg had a family to support
and did not have much money. Thus, Rabbi Jacobson tried to encourage Mr.
Stein to be compassionate and refrain from enforcing the judgment. If Mr.
Ginsberg made money in the future, Rabbi Jacobson would consider recon-
vening the Bet Din.'
Mr. Stein was very unhappy with the Bet Din's decision.' He felt that it
would be beneficial for the rabbis to know the litigants only if one had a los-
ing case because one could ask for rachmanes;67 otherwise, it was not helpful
for the rabbis to know the parties. Mr. Stein was angry at the process and the
decision. He felt that it was a waste of time. "I didn't need to spend $30,000
59. See id.
60. Interview with George Miller.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See Interview with George Miller; see also interview with George Williams.
65. See Interview with Rabbi Jacobson.
66. See Interview with George Stein.
67. Rachmanes is loosely translated as charity.
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to $40,000 for that."6
Mr. Stein thought that although the case was worth $700,000 to
$800,000 in damages, the rabbis did not want to render such a large judg-
ment against the defendant because they did not feel that he could pay it.
Therefore, they awarded Mr. Stein $60,000 for damages incurred while the
case was pending. 9
Mr. Williams did not think the case would have been decided much dif-
ferently in civil court. He felt that his client probably would not have fared
any worse in another forum, and putting two Orthodox Jews in front of a
jury in San Diego may have posed its own problems: "If you have someone
who is part of a narrow class of people, it's good if you can eliminate that
element by taking it in front of similar type people. This makes their differ-
ences a non-issue. ' 7o
Mr. Williams described the process as a "tribal thing, more like going to
village elders."'7' The parties knew that they would have to face each other
again, and rabbis attempted to help the parties reconcile and resolve their
disputes amicably rather than declare a winner and a loser, as is the goal in
civil court. The rabbis seemed to be looking for a common ground to medi-
ate the dispute, and they issued a ruling only as a last resort."
Mr. Miller described the process as "other worldly" because they all sat
around a table chatting and serving food, without much structure. He had to
resist the temptation to act more aggressively, as would have been appropri-
ate in civil court.73 Mr. Williams found the rabbis to be fair, intelligent, rea-
sonable people.74 Although Mr. Stein was not happy with the verdict, he did
not feel the rabbis could have done much better because the business was in-
evitably falling apart, and the parties were unable to resolve their differences
amicably." Mr. Williams would recommend a Bet Din to other clients only
for certain types of cases, such as where equity was on their side but the law
was technically against them.76
In contrast to the lawyer's favorable impressions of the Bet Din, Mr.
Stein had a different opinion as a litigant. He was deeply unhappy with the
entire process and with the decision they rendered. 7 Although he personally
liked the rabbis and considered them to be good friends, he felt they were "a
two on a scale of one to ten for professionalism. 7' There were too many
68. Interview with George Stein.
69. See id.
70. Interview with George Williams.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. See Interview with George Miller.
74. See Interview with George Williams.
75. See Interview with George Stein.
76. See Interview with George Williams.
77. See Interview with George Stein.
78. Id.
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complex issues to decide, and they were not competent enough to understand
the facts of the case. Except for Rabbi Chernofsky, they did not have experi-
ence sitting on a Bet Din and were not experienced enough to sit as judges.
Mr. Stein would use a Bet Din again, but he would be careful to select a Bet
Din with more experienced rabbis." Mr. Stein felt, however, that the rabbis
tried to have compassion and do the right thing: "the spirit of God is sup-
posed to come through it, and they may have done the right thing."8
II. ANALYSIS OF THE LITIGANTS' REACTIONS TO AND FEELINGS
ABOUT THE BET DIN
A. Misplaced Expectations and Resolution of Contradictory Cultural Models
The vast majority of respondents were extremely dissatisfied with the
Bet Din process, including those who ostensibly won their cases. All of the
litigants voiced similar complaints about the lack of experience or compe-
tence of the Bet Din that decided their case, and yet all felt that a different
Bet Din would have done a better job. Thus, although they were unhappy
with some aspect of their case, they continued to believe in the system as a
whole.
The vast majority of litigants also felt that the rabbis who heard their
cases tried to be fair and to render a just and moral decision. Several litigants
felt that the rabbis had bent over backwards to favor the underdog or to see
that justice was served. Most litigants felt the decisions were in some way
divinely inspired or were somehow meant to be. However, they still felt that
a different Bet Din would have somehow decided their cases differently.
In contrast to the litigants, all of the lawyers who represented clients be-
fore the Battei Din felt that it was a good forum in which to decide the cases.
They felt the rabbis were intelligent and fair, and they felt that the decisions
were reasonable. Several lawyers felt the rabbis were more "worldly" than
one would expect. The lawyers were impressed with the rabbis' efforts to be
fair and impartial.
One lawyer who had slight reservations about the Bet Din was himself
an Orthodox Jew. Although he felt the rabbis did not chastise the opposing
party for perpetrating what he considered to be fraudulent claims, he felt
that, in the end, the rabbis had made every effort to be fair and to render a
decision that was not influenced by ulterior motives.
The most common complaint voiced by the litigants was that the rabbis
were not competent to decide the complicated legal or technical issues be-
fore them. Mr. Stein, who has appeared in civil court several times, felt his
case was too complicated for the rabbis to understand. However, he felt the
rabbis who sat on the Bet Din of the Rabbinic Council of California in Los
79. See id.
80. Id.
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Angeles were bright and knowledgeable and that he would have gotten a
more favorable verdict from them.81
Mr. Stein's lawyer viewed the case differently. Although the lawyer
agreed that the case required a great understanding of technology and may
have been a bit complicated for the rabbis, he felt that "in this case, [Mr.
Stein] didn't do any worse than he would have in any other place. It was as
good a verdict as he would have gotten."'
In contrast to Mr. Stein, Mr. Newman, whose case was heard by the
same Bet Din who heard Mr. Stein's case, was upset that the rabbis strictly
applied the law and did not reach a moral or equitable result. Although Mr.
Newman realized that, in a court of law, he would have lost based on the
language of the contract, he felt that the rabbis should have looked beyond
the contract and decided the case on a moral basis, looking to the intent and
spirit of the contract. Instead, they issued a decision based on a strict inter-
pretation of the law.83
Another litigant whose case was decided by the Rabbinic Council of
California Bet Din in Los Angeles also felt the Bet Din was not competent to
decide his case. His case was quite complex, and he felt the rabbis did not
understand enough of the facts to render a decision. Furthermore, he felt they
made mistakes in evaluating the evidence. Ironically, while Mr. Stein felt
that the Rabbinic Council of California Bet Din in Los Angeles was more
knowledgeable and would have better understood his case, litigants before
that tribunal similarly complained about the competence of that tribunal's
rabbis.
Another litigant whose case was decided by a different Bet Din in Los
Angeles had similar complaints about the Bet Din that decided his case. He
felt that they were not knowledgeable about the law and did not give a ra-
tional explanation for their decision. He was so dissatisfied with the process
that he wrote a six-page letter to someone who is considering going to a Bet
Din, detailing the facts of his case and containing his advice. He complained
that the decisions were arbitrary and that the rabbis did not seem to fully
consider the facts of the case. Rather, he implies that the rabbis applied eq-
uity, often splitting the decision between what the two sides were asking for.
Furthermore, he was quite upset that they did not give a written decision ex-
plaining the basis for the judgment.
The other complaint voiced by all of the litigants was that the rabbis
who sat on the Bet Din knew the litigants too well to render an impartial de-
cision. Both of the litigants whose cases were heard by the Chabad Bet Din
in San Diego were regular members of the Chabad congregation and had
given money to the synagogue prior to having their cases heard. Mr. New-
man felt it was a major factor in the outcome of the decision. ' Mr. Stein also
81. See id.
82. Interview with George Williams.
83. See Interview with Peter Newman.
84. See Interview with Peter Newman.
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felt that the fact that the rabbis personally knew both of the parties affected
the rabbis' decision.'
One litigant went before a Bet Din that included the rabbi of the liti-
gant's synagogue, and the litigant served as the synagogue treasurer. The
litigant felt that, because the rabbi knew him, the rabbi may have bent over
backwards to favor the opposing party. As a result, the litigant felt that the
rabbi's personal relationship with him affected the rabbi's ability to render
an impartial decision. Another litigant also mentioned that several of the
rabbis who sat on his Bet Din had personal dealings with the litigants. He
felt that this personal relationship put pressure on him to have his case heard
before that Bet Din rather than go elsewhere. Thus, he did not feel free to
choose a Bet Din with which he may have felt more comfortable.
All of the litigants voiced some disappointment with their Bet Din's
failure to chastise or sanction the opposing party opponent for what they
perceived to be immoral or unethical behavior. One litigant was quite upset
that, despite the fact that the opposing party had threatened him and his fam-
ily and allegedly started a small fire at his home, the rabbis of his Bet Din
did not admonish or sanction that party. He was upset that they "let the guy
feel no consequences to threatening a person's family. They were strictly go-
ing by who owes who money. I ended up buying a .357 magnum."86
Others involved in the Bet Din echoed similar sentiments. One lawyer
complained that the rabbis failed to impose sanctions against the opposing
party for making blatantly fraudulent claims. At one point in the trial, he dis-
covered that the opposing party was presenting false and scandalous material
to the Bet Din. When he complained to the rabbi hearing the case, the rabbi
simply told him that it would not affect their decision. The lawyer felt that,
had he been in federal court, the court would have imposed sanctions on the
opposing party.
The overwhelming majority of the litigants would use the Bet Din again
to resolve their disputes with other Jews, in spite of the fact that they were
deeply unhappy with the process, but they would use a different Bet Din.
This response was common among those who felt a religious obligation to
use the Bet Din and among those who were less religious. Mr. Stein would
go to the Rabbinic Council of California Bet Din in Los Angeles in the fu-
ture because he felt they were more knowledgeable and competent.' Mr.
Newman would use a Bet Din in the future where the rabbis did not person-
ally know the litigants.88 One litigant, who used the Rabbinic Council's Bet
Din, and another litigant, who used a different Bet Din in the Los Angeles
area, would go to a Bet Din outside of California, probably in New York.
They did not feel there was a Bet Din in Los Angeles knowledgeable enough
85. See Interview with George Stein.
86. Interview with informant, Jan. 22, 1996.
87. See id.
88. See Interview with Peter Newman.
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or competent to hear cases. Thus, although all of the litigants were deeply
unhappy with their own experiences before the Bet Din, they continued to
believe in the system and to believe that their own experience was an aberra-
tion.
B. Analysis of the Bet Din
In an analysis of the cause of the litigants' dissatisfaction with their Bet
Din experience, one must first consider their overt complaints before enter-
taining alternative explanations. The most common complaint was that the
Bet Din was not competent to understand the complexities of the cases. This
complaint can be refuted based on the contradictions between the litigants
and their attorneys, and the lack of connection between the complaints and
the outcome of the cases. The second most common complaint was that the
rabbis who decided the cases knew the litigants, and their lack of impartial-
ity affected the outcome of the cases.
This complaint can also be refuted. Mr. Stein felt that, had he gone to
civil court, he would have won his case. He also felt his case was worth be-
tween $700,000 and $800,000.? Yet, his own attorney felt there was a good
chance they would have lost in civil court and that Mr. Stein did as well as
he would have in another forum." Furthermore, although Mr. Stein com-
plained that the rabbis bent over backwards for the opposing party, he admit-
ted that, overall, they made every effort to be fair and to reach an equitable
decision.9 Although he complained about the amount of his award, the rab-
bis ruled in his favor. His inability to collect the judgment was unrelated to
the decision of the Bet Din.
Mr. Newman's complaint that the rabbis based their opinion on the law
rather than on equity may indeed account for some of his dissatisfaction with
the verdict; however, he probably would have gotten the same verdict from a
secular court. Furthermore, his claim that a different Bet Din would have
rendered a different decision is unjustified. The fact that the rabbis knew
both parties did not necessarily seem to have affected their decision.
Another litigant complained that the case was too complex for the Bet
Din to understand, yet he admitted that they ruled in his favor. Furthermore,
both he and his attorney felt that the rabbis made every effort to be fair and
had no ulterior motives in rendering their decision, thus negating any com-
plaints of favoritism or lack of impartiality.
Many litigants were upset that the Bet Din often applied equity rather
than strictly applying the law. Many rabbis who sat on the Bet Din felt that
equity was a legitimate consideration, especially since so many cases fall
into gray areas. Although many litigants believed their cases would have
89. See Interview with George Stein.
90. See Interview with George Williams.
91. See Interview with George Stein.
2000]
15
Sturman: House of Judgment: Alternate Dispute Resolution in the Orthodox J
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
been decided differently if they had gone to civil court and received what
they felt was a strict legal opinion, in the vast majority of cases, these indi-
viduals may have either lost their cases in civil court or received a similar
decision. Furthermore, it was clear in several of the cases that the formal Bet
Din was convened only after attempts to mediate failed, thereby making the
Bet Din into an extension of the mediation process. The mediation process
involves compromises between the parties in an effort to reach an equitable
decision.
Lastly, even if one concedes that by basing their decision on equity
sometimes appears unfair to one of the parties, this perceived unfairness still
does not account for the depth of dissatisfaction regarding the Bet Din or the
seeming contradictions between the belief in the system as a whole and the
extreme dissatisfaction with their own experience. The answer thus lies
elsewhere.
One may argue that in any adversarial system, including the American
civil court system, people are bound to be unhappy with the decision of the
court.' Still, the level of dissatisfaction expressed by the litigants who ap-
peared before the Bet Din was far greater than that expressed by these liti-
gants in civil court. Even those who won their cases still seemed unhappy
with what had transpired. Furthermore, this strong desire to believe in the
system while simultaneously complaining about its practical application was
unique to those who had appeared before the Bet Din.
Misplaced expectations were the greatest cause of dissatisfaction in the
litigants who used the Bet Din. Most of the individuals who used the Bet Din
were deeply religious and chose the Bet Din out of a sense of religious obli-
gation. They felt that, in some way, the decisions rendered by the Bet Din
were divinely inspired, or willed by God. Thus, there seems to have been an
expectation that the Bet Din would do more than merely render a monetary
decision. Rather, the litigants were looking for a moral victory, for some
kind of pronouncement that the opposing party had acted immorally and
would be punished for such conduct.
Several of the litigants overtly stated that the rabbis should have im-
posed sanctions on the opposing parties for what they perceived to be im-
moral behavior. One party threatened the life of an opposing Bet Din par-
ticipant, and this participant asked the chief rabbi of his Bet Din to impose
sanctions for immoral behavior. Instead, the rabbi, who was the participant's
religious leader, merely told him that he was only there to decide the mone-
tary issues. Similarly, Mr. Newman wanted a pronouncement that although
the opposing party had acted within the letter of the law, the party acted un-
ethically by failing to abide by the spirit of their agreement. When he took
his case before the Bet Din, he was deeply unhappy that the rabbis decided
92. In my experience as a trial lawyer in the secular court system, for instance, I often
found clients unhappy with various aspects of the process, such as perceiving that their oppo-
nents were lying in court or feeling that the amount of the award should have been higher.
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the case based on a strict legal interpretation rather than issue a pronounce-
ment that the opposing party had acted unethically.93
Similarly, other Bet Din participants felt the opposing party was never
sanctioned or condemned for bringing a fraudulent claim or for committing
perjury before the Bet Din. Although the rabbis clearly ruled in favor of
these dissatisfied participants, they were quite upset that they had not made a
pronouncement against their opponents for what they perceived to have been
immoral behavior.
Aside from expecting the Bet Din to pass moral judgment on the oppos-
ing parties, the litigants also expected the Bet Din to somehow heal the hurt
feelings between the litigants and their opposing parties. Many of these indi-
viduals were in partnerships with other Orthodox Jews who had not only
been friends of theirs, but had been members of their congregation. These
individuals had been, in a sense, members of the same family. When the re-
lationship fell apart, there often seemed to be hurt feelings and feelings of
abandonment. Thus, when the litigants felt cheated or betrayed by their for-
mer partners, the litigants wanted the Bet Din to somehow heal or smooth
over the hurt or angry feelings. These expectations were unrealistic because,
as one lawyer put it, many of the cases were "no-win situations" because
there was no solution to the problems. Thus, when all the Battei Din could
do was render a monetary award, the litigants were deeply unhappy with the
outcome.
Similarly, because the litigants before the Bet Din were from the same
small community, they expected more from the rabbis sitting on the Bet Din
than from judges in a civil court because the rabbis were regarded in one
sense as family members. Thus, the litigants placed the rabbis in the role of
parental figures who were expected to render a moral judgment rather than
merely render a legal decision, as one would expect of a civil judge. These
were, after all, people whom the litigants saw frequently in the role of moral
leaders, people whose job was to lead them in prayer and remind them of
their moral and spiritual obligations. When the Bet Din merely issued a
compensatory judgment, the litigants were dissatisfied.
Similarly, the litigants were often members of the same congregation,
and there was an expectation that, just as a family member would not cheat
another family member, these individuals would deal fairly and ethically
with each other. When the litigants perceived that they had been cheated or
treated unfairly by people they thought of as family, they were even angrier
than if they had had a dispute with a non-family member. There was thus a
heightened expectation that the Bet Din, which was also made up of "family
members," would see that justice was fully served.
Lastly, the litigants expected the rabbis to understand and agree with
their position rather than merely sit as an impartial decision-making body.
Although, in practice, the rabbis could not sympathize with one position to
93. See Interview with Peter Newman.
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the exclusion of another, the misplaced expectation may have caused a great
deal of dissatisfaction. A study of litigants in small claims court revealed
that judges and litigants often have different expectations of the outcome of
cases. Three main areas of discord exist between litigants and the legal sys-
tem: first, litigants often sought intangible benefits from a system that was
designed solely to provide economic judgments; second, the litigants may
have had a non-economic agenda; and third, the litigants had "unrealistic ex-
pectations of the law's authority."94 In some cases, although litigants ostensi-
bly won monetary judgments in court, the litigants really desired intangible
benefits such as the opportunity to tell their stories to the judge or the satis-
faction of an injunction ordering the parties to leave each other alone.95
In much the same way, this sense of misplaced expectations seems to
have caused a great deal of anguish in the litigants who came before the Bet
Din. Although these individuals were sophisticated businessmen who under-
stood the purpose and function of the legal system, misplaced expectations
were a source of discord for these individuals when they came before the Bet
Din in a way that probably would not have existed if they had litigated in a
secular court. Just as litigants in small claims court wanted something from
the judges that the legal system was not designed to provide96 the litigants
before the Bet Din maintained similarly unrealistic expectations of what they
could obtain from the rabbis.
Lastly, the disparity between the ideals expressed by the litigants that
the Bet Din is a fair and divinely inspired system and the disappointment in
the outcome can be explained by examining how cultural representations, or
schemas, differ in the kind of motivational force they provide.'
A study that examined the motivations of American blue collar workers
revealed three different types of cognitive representations, or schemas," each
with different motivational effects." The first was the "American Dream"
schema: with hard work, anyone in America could get ahead. The second
schema was that, as a breadwinner, one's primary obligation was to support
one's family. The third schema was more personal and idiosyncratic, with
variations between individuals that shaped their self-defining goals and be-
haviors." o What distinguished the schemas that were statements of values
from those that actually motivated their actions was how the models had be-
come internalized. Although it first appeared that these men had conflicting
94. JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 126 (1990).
95. See id. at 129, 139,
96. See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 94, at 126.
97. See Claudia Strauss, What Makes Tony Run?, in HUMAN MOTIVES AND CULTURAL
MODELS 198 (Roy G. D'Andrade & Claudia Strauss eds., 1992).
98. A schema is "a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in mem-
ory." Id. at 198.
99. See id. at 199.
100. See id. at 204-05.
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models-one being the American dream to get ahead and the other being the
breadwinner to stay at a job in order to support one's family-the American
dream model was actually a statement of value, whereas the breadwinner
model was a knowledge of reality."'
Similarly, the litigants who appeared before the Bet Din had different
cultural models affecting their attitudes and motivations. The cultural model
guiding their values and beliefs was that the Bet Din was supposed to be a
fair system that was divinely inspired, part of God's greater plan. They con-
tinued to believe in this model in spite of evidence showing the system was
flawed or failed to meet their needs.
The cultural model based in reality holds that a legal system, whether
secular or religious in nature, is supposed to solve problems. When the Bet
Din failed to meet this cultural model by failing to solve problems to the liti-
gants' satisfaction, the litigants became disappointed in the Bet Din. How-
ever, rather than allow their experiences to contradict their value-laden cul-
tural model that the Bet Din was a better system, they created a dichotomy
between their experiences and the Bet Din as an institution. To maintain
their belief in the Bet Din's efficacy, they claimed that it was not the system
that had failed them but the individual Bet Din. Simply stated, the outcome
would have been better had they gone to another Bet Din. Two seemingly
conflicting schemas emerged: one representing a cultural value that the Bet
Din represented a just and fair system inspired by God and one representing
a model of reality that the Bet Din could not resolve their own problems. Yet
the dichotomy created by the litigants allowed them to reconcile these sche-
mas without undermining their beliefs and values.
CONCLUSION
The Bet Din has existed as an institution for thousands of years. Though
it has changed over time and from one country to another, it remains an im-
portant part of the Orthodox Jewish community's ability to maintain itself
and its traditions. Precisely because of its history and its ties to tradition, the
Orthodox community uses and supports the Bet Din, allowing it to continue
as an institution. The fact that its laws date back to ancient times and cover
minute procedural details heightens the importance of the Bet Din to Ortho-
dox Jews, whose central beliefs revolve around rituals and traditions set
forth in the law and followed for thousands of years. Their need to follow
their laws and traditions, their sense of religious obligation, is the primary
reason why many individuals use the Bet Din to resolve disputes between
each other.
The second reason people use the Bet Din is the importance of main-
taining a sense of community, of viewing each other as an extended family,
which manifests itself in their acquiescence to social pressure to use the Bet
101. See id. at 205-08.
20001
19
Sturman: House of Judgment: Alternate Dispute Resolution in the Orthodox J
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Din. This pressure flows from extensive religious laws requiring Orthodox
Jews to use their own courts to resolve disputes among themselves. Reli-
gious laws strictly prohibit using the courts of those they consider "outsid-
ers," even to the point of trying to keep the outside world from learning that
problems or disputes exist between them.
These two values both draw Orthodox Jews to use the Bet Din and
cause them extreme dissatisfaction with the Bet Din. Both religious obliga-
tion and social pressure from their community draw them to the Bet Din.
However, this also creates a sense of misplaced expectations, which can lead
to great dissatisfaction. They expect the Bet Din to do more than merely is-
sue legal rulings; they look to the rabbis to solve their problems in a way that
they would not expect from secular courts. Furthermore, there is an expecta-
tion that the rabbis will pronounce moral judgments, imposing sanctions on
the litigants who behave immorally or unethically toward another member of
the same "family" in much the same way as a parent would be expected to
do.
To resolve this conflict between believing in the Bet Din as an institu-
tion and dissatisfaction with the outcome, the litigants create two cultural
models: one model that continues to maintain their values and beliefs in the
institution and another model that criticizes their own cases. This allows
them to maintain their sense of value in the institution while simultaneously
expressing dissatisfaction with the process. As a result, the litigants continue
to be both drawn to the Bet Din, yet dissatisfied with the results. In a very
real sense, they both follow God's mandate to use the bet-din and expect
God-like results from it.
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